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Recently the study of  how children come to understand the psychological world,
known as the “theory of  mind,” has come under attack by a number of  psycho-
logists inspired by the work of  the philosopher Wittgenstein ( J. Carpendale &
Lewis, 2004; W. Sharrock & Coulter 2004; I. Leudar & A. Costall 2004; D.E.
Montgomery 2002). According to these authors, the theory of  mind is deeply
dependent upon an array of  uncritically adopted but contestable assumptions
from mainstream philosophy of  mind as espoused by people like Chomsky, Fodor,
Pylyshyn and Churchland. Some even quote one of  the most notorious—and




 (1953) where he
argues that the “confusion and barrenness” of  psychology is to be explained not
by its being a “young science” but by the fact that “the existence of  experimental
method makes us think we have a means of  solving the problems which trouble
us; though problem and method pass one another by.” (1953, p. 232). By assum-
ing that ordinary psychological concepts refer to mental states that are unobserv-
able and hypothetical in nature, and that are causally related to overt behaviour,
the theory of  mind makes the conceptual mistake of  misconstruing psychological
language as consisting of  an array of  names for referring to inscrutably hidden
mental states and processes. Wittgenstein’s rejection of  a “private language,” these
authors contend, have quite literal application here. In demonstrating the impos-
sibility of  “private ostensive definitions” for psychological concepts, Wittgenstein
has shown that introspection cannot be the way one learns their meaning.
Instead, meaning is based on use, on shared practices with others. To support this
claim Wittgenstein is cited as saying that inner processes stand in need of  outer
criteria (Carpendale & Lewis 2004, p. 84; Sharrock & Coulter 2004, p. 598).
The negative arguments of  Wittgenstein do have literal application here, but
what about his positive account of  psychological concepts? Is Wittgenstein’s posi-
tive account really captured by saying that inner processes are in need of  outer
criteria? And if  so, how about the stock response (Fodor & Chihara 1965; Paul
Churchland 1984) that Wittgenstein must perforce embrace some form of  behav-
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alternative to the resurgent mentalism of  the last half-century? My aim in this
article is to show that the recent Wittgensteinian recovery in developmental psy-
chology not only has given a mistaken interpretation of  his positive account of
psychological concepts but also, and more importantly, failed to take notice of  his
powerful idea of  the transferred use of  language, or as I also call it, the analogical
extension of  the primary use of  words to their secondary use. This idea, at least
so I argue, is especially relevant for current theoretical discussions about “fictive
mental states,” imagination and make-believe. In the First section, I briefly point
out what is mistaken about the generally assumed claim that Wittgenstein defends
a criterion approach to mental states. The idea of  the transferred use of  words,
which has been left largely unnoticed even in the secondary literature on
Wittgenstein, is introduced in section Two via the concept of  mental calculation.
In the Third section the idea of  the transferred use of  language is put to work in
the context of  the debate in developmental psychology concerning the child’s
pretend play.
 
“INNER PROCESSES” AND OUTWARD CRITERIA: SOME MISCONCEPTIONS
 
A number of  psychologists have argued that underlying theories in psycholinguis-
tics as well as developmental psychology is the “ostension paradigm” (Mont-
gomery 2002). According to this paradigm, semantic or conceptual development
is primarily a problem of  reference. Psychological nouns and verbs acquire mean-
ing by the child’s figuring out and establishing word-referent relations. This view
is based on several assumptions. The first is that psychological words function as
names referring to objects, events and processes. The second is that the referents
of  psychological words are private and internal. Thus, according to Wellman
(1990, p. 5), by age 3 years young children are dualists who are “knowledgeable
of  mental states as ontologically different from physical objects and real events.”
The problem the child has to overcome, on this view, is to figure out how words
refer to its own internal states and processes and what is going on in the private
and hidden realms of  other people’s minds. As German and Leslie (2000, p. 230)
put this problem: “[Given] that beliefs, desires and pretends can be neither seen,
heard nor felt, how does the young brain succeed in learning about them?” On
the theory of  mind (Wellman 1990; Lillard 1993), the problem is solved by a
process of  theoretical inference. On German’s and Leslie’s recent view (2002), the
problem is solved by special mechanisms that, prior to the formation of  mental-
istic theories, detect mental states. On the other hand, proponents of  a simulation
theory maintain that children develop an understanding of  psychological words
through introspection, and by using their imagination to reason about psycholog-
ical matters (Harris 1991).
Wittgenstein-informed developmental psychologists contest these two assump-
tions common to both the theory of  mind and the simulation theory. The idea
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that the meaning of  psychological language is acquired by a process of  labelling
private and internal referents, they argue, is to saddle up the child with a private
language. Wittgenstein’s private language arguments (1953) would have shown




 As especially Montgomery
(2002) makes clear, private language accounts of  the child’s command of  psycho-
logical language are plagued with problems of  indeterminacy. For instance, a
child noticing via introspection the intention underlying its reaching behaviour is
confronted with numerous first-person experiences: self-initiated movement,
anticipation, effort, curiosity, etc. An introspective ostensive definition cannot fix
the meaning of  terms unambiguously. Moreover, the private linguist is not only
confronted with the problem of  finding a unique referent for a word but also
with the problem of  comparing it with an exemplar of  some sort. The only rule
the child can follow is something like “Is this (new sensation) the same as that
(exemplar)?” But as Wittgenstein has described in a number of  striking aphorisms,
it does not make sense to speak of  following a rule when one is simultaneously
jury and defendant. “The private linguist is imagining the criterion for correctness
and imagining whether it has been satisfied; consequently that person cannot
distinguish following a rule from seeming to follow it.” (Montgomery 2002,
p. 363)
In response to this individualistic explanation of  the child’s understanding of
mind, some developmental psychologists now argue that meaning is based on
shared practice and public rules, thereby again taking Wittgenstein as their point
of  departure. This idea is often expressed by quoting Wittgenstein’s (1953 §580)
dictum that “An ‘inner’ process stands in need of  outward criteria” (Chapman
1987; Montgomery 2002; Carpendale & Lewis 2004). Both their interpretation
of  this dictum and their account of  criteria, however, display some serious flaws.
Relying on Chapman (1987), Carpendale & Lewis (2004, p. 88) claim that “chil-
dren learn about inner processes (their own and other people’s) through public
criteria, not through their subjective experience; that is, they learn the appropriate
contexts for the use of  various words referring to the psychological world.” There
are three problems with this account. One, their definition of  criteria is ambiva-
lent. Second, their stricter definition is an erroneous generalization. Third, their
account of  especially the first person leads to behaviourism. As to the first point,
criteria are taken to include the circumstances in which words are used, but at
the same time the authors hold a stricter notion by claiming that they are “behav-
ioural evidence for inner experiences such as sensations, emotions, thinking,
remembering, imagining and so forth.” To be sure, one teaches a child the use of
the word, e.g. “to think,” under certain circumstances, yet it need not and does
not learn those circumstances themselves. A child must learn only under what
circumstances the word is to be withheld, e.g. on grounds of  pretence or play-
acting, but a description of  the circumstances in which it is correctly used is not
only not required but also impossible. Indeed, is there any less general answer to
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“In coming to talk.”? As to the second point, to conclude from the dictum “An
‘inner’ process stands in need of  outward criteria” that criteria are behavioural




 is a generalization based on ignoring the




 The reason Wittgen-
stein put “inner process” between scare-quotes is not just typographical but indic-
ative of  a fundamental difference between types of  psychological concepts. The




 is the logic of  so-called
propositional attitudes like believing and expecting. Unlike pain these are not




 does not involve having a sensation or




, unlike feeling pain, cannot be inter-
rupted, does not cease with loss of  consciousness or resume on awaking, etc.
Criteria therefore are needed not because propositional attitudes refer to inner
experiences, as Carpendale and Lewis assume, but because they do not. This also
shows that criteria are not so much meant as to provide evidence for the presence
or absence of  inner states but rather as saying what sort of  psychological concept
a concept is. As to the third point, Carpendale and Lewis claim that criteria play
a role both in the first person and the third person use of  psychological language.
Or as Chapman put this point: it is through the observation of  pain-behavior in
ourselves and others that we learn to use the word ‘pain’ correctly.” (Chapman
1987, p. 105). They support their interpretation by quoting Wittgenstein saying
(1953 §244): “words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of
the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself  and he cries; and
then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They
teach the child new pain-behaviour” (Carpendale & Lewis 2004, p. 88). It is
noteworthy that in this very passage Wittgenstein does not speak of  “criteria.”
Moreover, the final sentences of  this passage not quoted by Carpendale and Lewis
make clear that “pain” in the first person is as little based on criteria as the child’s
crying is based on criteria, and that since “I am in pain” does not describe
behaviour but replaces it Wittgenstein is no behaviourist: “So you are saying that
the word ‘pain’ really means crying?—On the contrary: the verbal expression of
pain replaces crying and does not describe it.” Chapman’s and Carpendale’s and
Lewis’ reading makes Wittgenstein into a logical behaviourist equating the mean-
ing of  psychological concepts with concepts referring to behaviour.
Attributing to Wittgenstein behaviourism, in whatever form, misses the point
of  a very fundamental aspect of  his philosophy of  language and mind. In §244 the
reference to the natural array of  instinctive reactions is not meant to attack one
referential explanation of  the meaning of  words only to embrace another. It is
two, opposed, referential explanations he attacks—one in terms of  inner experi-
ences, the other in terms of  overt behaviour. His own explanation is on a different
level. Basic to his later philosophy is the idea that a sentence’s having sense
depends on other sentences being true. These latter sentences are about a certain
sort of  human agreement. There must be human agreement of  a certain sort for
our language to fulfil its roles. With respect to pain-language this agreement
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concerns what happens naturally when people are in pain: they moan, cry, tend
the part that has been hurt and say “It hurts.” The basic point is that if  people
did not naturally groan and cry, then it would be impossible to teach children the
word pain. This is not a behaviouristic explanation for moaning is not describing,
hence not a description either of  behaviour or of  experience; it is an explanation
of  the preconditions of  sense.
The idea that a sentence’s having sense depends on other sentences being
true is also the main point of  Wittgenstein’s critique of  the “ostension paradigm.”
To be sure, as Montgomery points out, Wittgenstein also shows that the mere




 leaves open endlessly




” should be used. An ostensive
definition can never, by itself, fix the meaning of  a word. On the other hand,
when ostensive practices succeed—and Wittgenstein has not the slightest doubt
about this—it is against a tacit background of  a great many assumptions about
language and the world that we tend to pass by unnoticed. For instance, the
ostensive definition “This is red” secures immediate uptake only when the child
has some knowledge of  colours, knows that they are classified into kinds, and
knows that the teacher is not only uttering a word but a name which functions to
designate a class. Naming cannot fix meaning because it is itself  a semantically
sophisticated act that presupposes a great deal of  conceptual stage-setting and
language mastery.
“Am I doing child psychology?—I am making a connexion between the con-
cept of  teaching and the concept of  meaning.” (Zettel §412). The recent resur-
gence of  Wittgensteinian ideas in psychology seems to miss the point of  this





providing the basis for an alternative (criterion-based) theory concerning the
child’s understanding of  the mind. Carpendale and Lewis seem to be aware of
this point, yet go on to claim that this does not preclude to begin from the
foundations that Wittgenstein has cleared. In particular they start from his anal-
ysis that “meanings of  words only exist in particular contexts” (Carpendale &
Lewis 2004, p. 133). Bringing the concept of  teaching to bear upon the concept
of  meaning, however, belongs to the compendium of  devices Wittgenstein intro-
duced into philosophy in order to remind us of  facts of  language and life often
taken for granted or overlooked in theorizing. What is taken for granted—also or
especially in theories of  concept formation—is the role of  conceptual stage-setting.
The recent discussion in psychology about “fictive mental states” especially show
how easy—and how fatal—it is to overlook conceptual stage-setting. In the next
sections I argue that this idea is at the bottom of  the transferred use of  language.
“Fictive mental states” do not refer to special sorts of  mental states, but are more
complex uses of  language, i.e. transferred uses of  language. Since this criticism
especially concerns the theory of  mind, it can be seen as providing further support
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MENTAL CALCULATING: A CASE STUDY OF THE TRANSFERRED USE OF LANGUAGE
 
The notion of  the transferred use of  language is largely implicit in Wittgenstein’s









 According to this view, in concept forma-
tion the use of  a certain class of  psychological concepts is extended to include
another domain of  phenomena than the one covered by the original class. Instead
of  the transferred use of  language one might also speak of  the analogical extension




 The original use of  concepts might be called the
primary use and the use resulting from the analogical extension the transferred
or secondary use of  these concepts (instead of  “use” one may also speak of
“sense,” in particular “secondary sense.”). For several reasons the terms “primary”
and “secondary” can be misleading. “Primary” is not to be taken in an epistemo-
logical sense. The term is used in a loose way and refers to the paradigmatic use
of  a certain class of  concepts. “Secondary” is not to be taken in the sense of  less
important, dispensable or even anomalous language. Yet, Wittgenstein’s most
explicit example of  secondary sense might give this impression. It is concerned
with what is described in the psychological literature as “synaesthesia,” or the
mixing of  senses (Cytowic 1989). For instance, hearing-colour synesthetes “see”
colours when they hear particular sounds. More commonly, however, the mixing
of  sense experiences in synaesthesia occurs for different perceptual properties
within the same modality, for instance, letters may elicit synaesthetic experiences
of  colour (Rich & Mattingley 2002; Rich, Bradshaw & Mattingley 2005). Witt-
genstein also discusses lexical-colour synaesthesia but his most striking example
concerns associating the predicates “fat” and “lean” to describe the days of  the
week. He says himself  to be inclined to call Wednesday fat and Tuesday lean.
Wittgenstein, however, is not concerned with explaining how such associations
have come about; his interest lies in accounting for how “fat” and “lean” can be
used outside their normal categories at all.
Commenting upon his inclination to call Wednesday fat and Tuesday lean he
asks whether “fat” and “lean” have some different meaning here from their usual
one. The suggestion is that words used in a secondary sense do not differ in
meaning from their primary use. In any case, asked what other meaning “fat” as
applied to the days of  the week has, one cannot tell. Indeed, the one thing one
cannot do is to explain the meaning of  “fat” by pointing to Wednesday. Hence,




 And one might add, one has
not been taught the meaning of  the word “fat” in two different ways either. For
this reason secondary sense is not the same as non-univocal meaning of  words;
“bank” does change its meaning when taken in one sense or another. Metaphor-
ical use equally involves transferring words from their home base to another
context, but Wittgenstein emphatically denies that secondary use is metaphorical.




 is yellow’ I do not mean: ‘yellow’ in a metaphorical
sense,—for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means
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of  the word ‘yellow.’ ” (1953, p. 216) Metaphors depend on the apprehension of
likenesses or analogies of  one sort or another. But if  someone would say “ ‘e’ ” is
like yellow’ he would not express the same experience synesthetes would express




 yellow.” Moreover, with straightforward metaphors it is always
possible to establish the similarities and analogies one wishes to highlight inde-
pendently of  the metaphorical language in question. Here, however, the “ana-
logy” logically cannot be paraphrased and cannot be described without using the
familiar word, i.e. “fat,” in its secondary sense. Were one to drop the “analogy”
with the primary sense of  “fat” nothing would remain of  one’s attempt to describe
the specific synaesthetic experience. A secondary sense, or a transferred use of
language, then, does not stand on its own but is preconditioned by conceptual
stage-setting in two ways: its meaning can be explained only by referring to the
paradigms used in the primary sense; and one cannot be inclined to use a word
in a secondary sense unless one understands it in its primary sense.
“Fat Wednesday” is a non-systematic transferred use of  language. Calling
Wednesday fat gives one no clue as to what would be meant if  another term (from
the same domain) would be substituted for “fat,” for instance “weighs more
than.” There are also systematic transferred uses. In such cases a whole system of
descriptions is transferred to an analogical use. A particularly interesting example
is “mental calculating.” Precisely because it is so pervasive and familiar the con-
cept of  mental calculating does not stand out as “fat Wednesday” obviously does.
Usually enough of  the standard surroundings of  the primary use of  calculating are
present to make this transition natural. Thus one normally is dealing with a
person who has had regular school training, who is given a problem that falls
within her normal competence, and who does not produce an answer at once,
but instead falls silent for a moment and comes up with the correct answer. If
asked how she got the answer so quickly she may reply for instance that she used
the trick of  dividing by eight and moving the decimal point instead of  multiplying
directly by one-hundred. Indeed, the standard surroundings are so obvious that
one may easily be mislead into supposing that it is just a matter-of-course descrip-




 It is precisely in this trap that mentalism has
fallen. According to mentalism, the meaning of  “mental calculation” is something
going on in one’s head. As the philosopher D.M. Armstrong put it “. . . are we




: something that goes on in us at the time of  the
calculation?” (Armstrong 1968, p. 69).
A Wittgenstein-informed position does not differ from mentalism in simply
denying that mental calculating is an inner process or activity. The point is that
mentalism mistakenly construes this “inner process” on the model of  its outward
counterpart, i.e. overt calculating, and that it feels justified to do so by superficial
grammatical similarities. Thus, in both cases the concept is of  something that
occurs within a stretch of  time and that can be said to consist of  stages or steps
(Budd 1988). This and other similarities encourage the idea of  two areas, the
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according to Wittgenstein, trying to hold the (superficial) analogy throughout is
precisely the mistake. In the first place, there is no clear sense to the idea of  an
inner analogue of  the vehicle of  overt calculating, i.e. numbers spoken, written or
typed in. Moreover, even if  there were such inner surrogates of  the vehicle of
calculating they could not assume the role of  inner processes for I might mis-
interpret them or simply be unaware of  them. In the second place, no such aware-
ness is demanded by the concept of  mental calculation. Wittgenstein describes
a number of  thought experiments showing that calculating processes similar to
writing down columns of  numbers or typing in numbers on a display are not
demanded by the concept of  mental calculation. Closer to home, take calculating
geniuses (Treffert & Wallace, 2004). The American psychiatrist Benjamin Rush
described as early as 1789 the lightning-quick calculating ability of  Thomas
Fuller, who understood little math more complex than counting. When Fuller was
asked how many seconds a man had lived by the time he was 70 years, 17 days





 The important thing to note is that here too we speak of  calculating, even
though no process has taken place analogous to what we would recognize as such.
In the third place, if  mental calculation is a concept of  a certain kind of  inner
process, its meaning must be taught indirectly. Since what happens in one person’s
imagination is not open to another person’s observation, the best that can be done
is that one person guesses when the right kind of  process is going on in another,
and by directing the subject’s attention to this occurrence hope that he will give
himself  the correct private ostensive definition (Budd 1988). But as we have seen
nothing can be based on private ostensive definitions.
The Wittgensteinian criticism is conceptual: mental calculation is not a concept
of  the same kind as overt calculating only differing in subject matter. Rather it is
a secondary concept that has come about by a linguistic process of  analogical
development. The unmistakeable connection between mental and overt calcula-
tion is of  a different order than analogies and metaphors established on a process
of  selecting, emphasizing and suppressing features of  a mental process and
projecting them upon overt calculating, or conversely. The reason that mental




 way to describe it is
in terms of  overt processes. With normal analogies (e.g. “marriage is a zero-sum
game”) the features of  the primary subject (marriage) one wishes to highlight by
means of  features of  the secondary subject (game) are in fact independent of  there
being such features (games) at all. Describing what the mental process is, however,
is something that cannot be done independently of  the system of  concepts belong-




 one speaks of
“multiplying, adding and taking away numbers” is part of  the experience of
mental calculation. Were one to drop the analogy with overt calculating nothing
would remain of  the attempt to describe (and to have) the experience of  mental
calculation. This means that the child’s analogical extension of  the concept of
calculating is not the same as an exercise in figurative language. Facts described
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in figurative language can normally also be described in non-figurative language.
If  the analogical description of  mental processes cannot be contrasted with a
literal description, then it is essential to the description of  mental processes.
Wittgenstein reminds philosophers and psychologists of  this irreducibly ana-
logical use of  the concept of  calculating in this passage: “Only if  you have learnt
to calculate—on paper or out loud—can you be made to grasp, by means of  this
concept, what calculating in the head is.” (Wittgenstein 1953, p. 216) This passage
may easily but mistakenly be read as an empirical proposition not unlike those to
be found in the work of  for instance Piaget. However tempting such a reading
may seem, the point is not that children in fact have to learn mental calculation
with the aid of  external devices such as pen-and-paper before learning the ability
to calculate in their head. Although many children if  asked to work out a sum will
automatically reach for pencil and paper, it is conceivable that an initiate learns
to compute without ever writing down sums or speaking aloud, but just by observ-
ing the pen-and-paper techniques of  its teacher. Still, in such a case it would be
taught how to go on. A child acquires the concept of  calculating through being
trained as the rest of  us do to certain things. This agreement is part of  the
conceptual stage-setting of  the concept of  mental calculation. If  the necessity for
the agreement is overlooked then so will be the necessity of  the child’s having
been trained to react to certain things in a certain way for it to mean anything
by counting loudly. And so it may seem that a child, without having learned the




 by learning mental calculation. That
this is incoherent is evident from Wittgenstein’s question whether it can be imag-
ined that a whole society, say a primitive tribe, might be acquainted only with
mental calculation. An essential criterion for speaking of  mental calculation would
no longer be available: the possibility to check on paper one’s results and in this
way to agree with others. It would be senseless to attribute to a member of  this
tribe the concept of  mental calculation not because it would be senseless to
attribute mental processes to him, but because nothing would count as a correct
result of  mental calculation. The command and use of  mental computation there-
fore does not depend on inner mental processes but on the preceding command
of  the concept of  overt calculation.
One of  the interesting consequences of  Wittgenstein’s reminder is that there is
a developmental relation between different sorts of  concepts. The command of
overt calculation is a logical prerequisite for the formation of  the concept of
mental calculation, but not vice versa. What the child learns therefore is a new
use of  the concept of  calculation, a transferred use that is. It has learnt the
concept of  counting, multiplying and adding in specific circumstances, and sub-
sequently it learns to apply them in different circumstances thereby acquiring a
new use of  language. Moreover, what the child learns when acquiring psycholog-
ical terms like mental calculating is based on a knowledge acquisition that does
not relate to occurrences and happenings in its mind but on public and physical
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dependence among concepts is inexplicable. For the mentalist mental calculation




 behaviour (it is calculating but not
loudly). Actual performances provide merely evidence for the underlying compu-
tational processes. The preceding analysis has shown that mental computation is




behavioural and physical components. The use and command of  this concept
depend on the behaviour and circumstances that characterize overt calculating.
Therefore the use of  mental calculation cannot be investigated by considering that
use alone. On the mentalist view, instead, nothing obliges one to take the preced-




Whereas usually enough of  the standard surroundings of  calculating are present
so as not to make one recognize mental calculating as a secondary use, the child’s
pretend play is often so imaginative that there should be no problem in identifying
it as secondary. In this section, I will show that psychologists in the wake of  Leslie’s
seminal paper (Leslie 1987) have nevertheless failed to see pretend play and
make-believe as secondary. As a consequence, they have sought to explain pre-
tence in terms of  mental representations whereas it needs to be explained as a
transferred use of  language and related activities. But before going on a brief
remark about secondary use of  words and secondary activities. If  pretend play
is secondary it is more appropriate to speak of  a secondary activity than of  a
secondary use of  words. Nevertheless talking about a secondary activity will
involve the use of  words in a secondary sense. To the extent that the child’s
activities involve the use of  words they will also be secondary.
Leslie’s seminal paper (Leslie 1987) starts with the assumption that the child’s
pretence and make-believe are so deviant, even nonsensical, that it poses a serious
threat to its cognitive development. Pretend representations are sharply con-
trasted with “reality-oriented” representations which are taken as paradigmatic of
what evolution is all about. About the (by now) standard example, “This banana
is a telephone,” he says: “Such nonsense violates the basic design principle of
primary representation that it represent in a literal fashion.” (Leslie 1987, p. 9).
Following McCune-Nicolich (1981), he claims that children who pretend have a
“double knowledge” about the situation. That is to say, they are pretending that
a chair is a train, but at the same time they know that it is a chair really. This
double knowledge is interpreted as involving the presence of  two simultaneous
mental representations; literal or primary representations and pretend represen-
tations both referring to the same actual situation. This poses a potential threat
for the child, namely that of  representational abuse. How can a child who holds
a primary representation of  a real object, i.e. a chair, at the same time think as if
it were a train? How is it that the child’s representational system is not totally
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undermined by this—is it a chair or is it a train? Both representations cannot be
primary as they contradict each other semantically. On the language of  thought
hypothesis espoused by Leslie mental representations also underlie the use of
language, and hence the child’s primary use of  words should equally be under-
mined by its use of  pretend language.
To account for the child’s ability to pretend play and make-believe without
contaminating its system of  primary representations, Leslie argues that the pretence
representations must be “quarantined off ” in some way. Pretence representations
are produced by copying primary representations into a meta-representational
context. This second-order context gives a report or a quotation of  the first-order
expression. In this way, it makes opaque the expression that was previously
transparent. For example, when the child represents the world seriously or in
reality-oriented play it may have the representation 
 
The cup is full of  water
 
. But in
pretending that the cup is full of  water its representation will have the content
 
I pretend “the cup is full of  water”
 
. The quotation marks indicate that the expression
contained in them is decoupled from its primary context, thereby suspending its
normal semantics. Meta-representations are freed up from their usual meanings,
from their normal input-output relations, so that one object can substitute for a
different object without the child confusing actual semantic relations.
It is noteworthy that no actual cases of  representational abuse are cited or
discussed either in the older or in the recent literature. Consider for instance this
observation by a child psychologist now almost forgotten but before the Second
World War one of  the most prominent European psychologists and precursor of
Jean Piaget, Karl Bühler. Typical of  illusory games, as he called pretend play, is
that the child is completely absorbed by it, yet in the background of  his mind the
distinction between play and reality is firmly rooted (Bühler, 1918). Or take his
contemporary, the philosopher and psychologists Alexius Meinong, who intro-
duced a new category of  psychological phenomena, supposals, to deal adequately
with a number of  psychological facts among them pretend play. But notice his
description of  pretend play:
 
“. . . that the child at play really is in a state of  delusion during its play, i.e., that a chair which it
has harnessed to the table as a horse to a wagon really is taken by the child to be a horse and
that the table really is taken to be a wagon . . . any person who has had the opportunity to
observe children is far more likely to have had occasion to wonder at the sureness with which
children even at an early age know how to distinguish between play and reality, than to find
them confusing such situations.” (Meinong 1910, p. 83)
 
More recently, Lillard (1994) has given a fairly complete description of  forms
of  abuse. She distinguishes three ways in which the “real-pretend boundary”
could be lacking. One is that the barrier does not exist, and children assume
that the pretend world and the real world are one. This she considers not likely,
the reason being that if  children had not a basic awareness of  the barrier, their
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that such reality confusion does appear to occur with fantasies that parents
want children to believe are real, like Santa Claus, but that “it does not appear
to happen in other cases, when parents are not trying to dupe their children.”
(Lillard 1994, p. 216) The second way that the real-pretend boundary might




Real-world knowledge indeed seeps into pretend play, Lillard argues, but this
speaks only of  the fact that it is a subset of  children’s behaviour, not that children
do not differentiate what is real from what is pretend. Another possibility is that
pretend-world elements travel in the reverse direction. For example, children
“might expect that if, in the pretend world, a block was a cookie, then in real life
that which is called ‘cookie’ should actually be a block. Although it has not been
directly studied, the available reports suggest no such confusion.” (Lillard 1994,
p. 217)
Despite the absence of  evidence for representational abuse psychologists feel
nevertheless forced to offer an empirical explanation of  why it does (probably) not
occur. Talk of  a membrane is as metaphorical as talk of  a decoupling mechanism,
yet the idea is that such metaphors can be unpacked in more straightforward
mechanistic concepts thereby emphasizing the empirical nature of  the explana-
tion. The absence of  evidence for representational abuse, however, could also be
a sign of  the conceptual nature of  the problem. Since the problems dealt with
concern at least partly the (semantical) question what is called “pretence” concep-




 If  the problem is conceptual its roots are to
be found in a mistaken or deficient view of  the way concepts function, how they
are related to one another and how they are taught. Consider now this remark
from Wittgenstein:
 
“Only children who know about real trains are said to be playing trains. And the word trains in
the expression ‘playing trains’ is not used figuratively, nor in a metaphorical sense” (Wittgenstein
1982 §800).
 
The first sentence says that the command of  pretence requires conceptual
stage-setting, whereas the second sentence says that to recognize that words may
be used in a secondary sense is to see that they are not meaningless in these
secondary uses even if  one cannot give an account of  what they mean in words
used in their primary senses as can be done with figurative language. It is indeed
a striking fact that almost no references are made to how children are taught




 The problem of  representational abuse
therefore may well reflect a failure to see the significance of  the fact that the
understanding of  words used in a primary sense is necessary for a child to be able
to pretend-play and make-believe. But one must distinguish between a stronger




 In the case of  fat and lean, as in the case of  calcu-
lating, the secondary use logically could not exist without the primary use. On the
other hand in the case of  pretence the relation is weaker. For it is possible that
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children of  a tribe who know nothing of  trains pick up the game of  trains from
others and play it without realizing that the game is copied from something. But
as Wittgenstein remarks about this case: “One might say that the game did not




 to them as to us.” (Wittgenstein 1953 §282) For instance, the
child’s game would fail a standard or example to compare with and hence ques-
tions as to the quality of  its play could not arise. More importantly, because
“train” would not be a transferred use of  language (from the primary use) its
being mentioned by those children would in fact be arbitrary and a completely
different word might have been used as well. And because the word—whether
“train” or some other—would not have been transferred from the primary use it
could be explained, at least among those children, simply by referring to what
they actually did when playing their game. This latter point is again in conflict
with the dependency relation implied by secondary sense. For another way in
which the latter depends on the former is that its meaning is explained by refer-
ence to paradigms involved in the primary use, not the secondary use. Put other-
wise, in this hypothetical case a child does not mean what a child would who
makes-believe that the chair is a train. Hence, here too children cannot be
inclined to engage in the activity of  playing trains unless they are familiar with
the use of  “train” in a primary sense. Because the understanding of  “train” in the
pretend context depends on the understanding of  the same word in the non-
pretend context, doubt about whether an object is a chair or a train simply
cannot arise.
Indeed, the sceptical question, is it a chair or is it a train, can arise only on the
assumption that the child has learned the meaning of  the word “train” independ-
ently of  the ability to use it of  real trains. The problem of  representational abuse
therefore is not a problem caused by the epistemic predicament of  the child’s
system of  mental representations, but by overlooking the fact that a certain region
of  language, i.e. pretend language, cannot be understood by considering that use
alone but only by taking into account uses of  language on which it logically
depends. Thus, by overlooking the role of  language learning and training it may
seem that a child, without having learnt the concept of  “pain” might start by
learning “My doll is in pain.” But this use of  language is a secondary use and
hence dependent on the one in which one commands the primary use of  pain,
much as “It seems to me to be red,” is dependent on reacting, without more ado,
to “What colour is this?’ with “Red.” Representational abuse then is precluded
by a prerequisite of  language and communication, i.e. agreement in reactions and
responses as established by being trained to use language. No quarantining mech-
anisms in the mind or brain can have the role agreement has in concept forma-
tion. That pretend elements do not seep in across the “barrier,” as Lillard herself
admits, is not due to the structure of  a sort of  mental membrane but to the
practice of  teaching and using pretend language against the background of  para-
digms involved in the primary use of  words. On the other hand, the fact that real-
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does not “merely reflect that knowledge from one domain is applied in another
domain.” (Lillard 1994, p. 216) For the question remains why this transfer does
not lead to an erosion of  the barrier. That no such confusion occurs is a reflection
of  the fact that the transfer leads to a new, and hence, different use of  language,
a secondary use that is.
Leslie’s mechanism is not only helpless in maintaining the conditions of  sense,
it even undermines them. The postulated decoupling mechanism protects the
primary representation from contamination by making a copy of  the primary
representation the normal semantics of  which is suspended. But Leslie’s use of  the
term “copy” here trades on an ambiguity. On the one hand he refers to the
analogy with editing a copy of  a word-processing file which implies that the copy
and the original are identical in content but physically separated. But then the
copy, contrary to what Leslie intends, should have the very same semantic pro-
perties as the original. On the other hand decoupling is said to effect a mental copy,
a representation of  a primary representation but without the semantic properties





 Such an account of  pretence makes it impossible to explain that
the child, if  asked what it meant by “pain” when pitying its doll, will not refer to
its doll but to the primary use of  this concept. Yet it is precisely in virtue of  this
dependency relation with the primary use that the child is inclined to treat its doll




 Leslie’s explanation of
the concept of  pretence in terms of  mental representations therefore undermines
the conditions of  sense.
To see more clearly the nature of  this criticism it is necessary to have a closer
look at other criticisms of  Leslie’s position, especially those of  Lillard. Proponents
of  the view that pretend play is meta-representational have drawn a functional
link between pretence and theory of  mind, hence a capacity for understanding
mental representation (Baron-Cohen 1991; Leslie 1987, 1988). On the other
hand, Lillard has contested this linkage before the age of  five. For a child to
possess the concept of  pretence in the full sense of  that term, she argues, at least
two conditions have to be met. The child’s pretence must involve having mental
representations, for: “If  one knew absolutely nothing about horses, and did not





 In addition, the child needs to be aware of, to think about what one is
doing, e.g. dealing with a pretend cookie. Without such awareness, Lillard con-
cludes, the child would be merely mistaken, rather than pretending (Lillard 1994,
p. 213). In one of  her experiments she has shown that young children do not yet
command the concept of  pretence in the full sense, but instead understand it as
external manifestation only. Four- and five-year-olds were shown a troll and were
told, for example, “This is Moe, and he’s from the Land of  Trolls. Moe’s hopping
around, kind of  like a rabbit hops. Moe doesn’t know that rabbits hop like that;
he doesn’t know anything about rabbits. But he is hopping like a rabbit.” Then
children were asked, “Would you say he’s pretending to be a rabbit, or he’s not
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pretending to be a rabbit?” Over four trials as well as several variations on this
experiment, about 65% of  4- and 5-year-olds have consistently claimed that the
character was in fact pretending to be a kangaroo. “In effect,” Lillard points out,
“children were asked whether mental representation or action was the more
important factor to consider in judging whether a character was engaging in
pretence.” (Lillard 1994, p. 223)
To conclude from these experiments that children are not aware that
pretence involves mental states and hence are not in command of  the concept




The experimental outcome seems to be in conflict with naturalistic situations
in which children won’t be readily inclined to ask other children to join in doll
play when they know they have never heard of  dolls and do not even know
they exist. On the other hand, children in real life might pick up a game from
others without realizing that their game was copied from something real. It
would be legitimate in such cases to say that the children are playing a game,
and also that their game looked like the game the playing of  which is based on




 Finally, when the test question would have been
formulated in non-mental yet functionally equivalent terms the outcome might
well have been different. For instance, “Moe has never heard of  rabbits, yet he
hops like a rabbit without having copied this behaviour from real rabbits.” By
using mental terms and by limiting the test questions to a simple “Is Moe
pretending to be a rabbit or not?” the experiment does not test for this sort of
understanding. Indeed, as has also been objected by German and Leslie (2001)
the outcome of  the experiment may be due to pragmatic factors. In particular
children may be unwilling to leave unresolved precisely what the protagonist was
supposed to be doing and why. Perhaps children simply chose the only interpre-
tation on offer.
If  the outcome of  the experiment may be incorrect, what about Lillard’s claim
that the early grasp of  pretence is behaviouristic and that not until mental repre-
sentations come in the child has acquired the full concept? Her mistake is to think
that the knowledge required for concept possession is having a theory of  mental
representations, the way they are produced, and how they issue in behaviour. As
the example of  mental calculating also illustrated the command of  “fictive mental
states” depends on knowledge acquisition that does not involve what we would
usually consider to be mental state terms. Doll play, for instance, is a form of
make-believe that requires the preceding command of  concepts like caring, pity,
pain or kissing as they are applied outside the game in their home base. Similarly,
when children make believe as if  inanimate objects feel pain or are happy, while
at the same time denying that these objects can think, this need not mean that
their grasp of  pretence is in terms of  action only (Lillard 1998). The conceptual
stage-setting for the child’s behaviour in this case is that it supposes that the
inanimate objects command a language and it is in virtue of  this capacity that it
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tales children have no trouble with the idea that the pot can see and hear things,
but in fairy tales pots also speak, walk about, etc. (Wittgenstein 1953 §281). Or
consider the (young) child’s use of  pictures. For instance, a child points to a
picture in her illustrated fairy tales and says “That is an angry woman, and that
is her eye.” This a transferred use of  language. Children learn this use of  pictures
and hence the secondary use of  words (“angry” as applied to a picture-face)
long before they have the capacity to talk in terms of  intentions, not to speak of
mental representations. And as every parent knows this priority of  the secondary
use of  words over the talk of  intentions and mental representations in no way
leads the child into “representational abuse,” i.e. confusing the word “eye” as




 it would be nonsense to say
that the child cannot really see the figure as an angry woman because for that to
be possible it must have the intention to represent the lines and dots on the
picture as eyes, noses or whole faces. But to say that the child must be engaged
in making a comparison between what it literally sees and what it represents it as
being is to have things upside down. Describing pictures by what they represent





It might seem as if  I am now joining Germane and Leslie (2001) who recently
have objected to Lillard that her assumption that concept possession depends
upon knowledge is mistaken. If  anything, they reply, a representational theory of
mind is a consequence of  possessing concepts like pretence and believe not a
prerequisite. Rather than depending on knowledge, concepts may exist prior to
knowledge and may depend on mechanisms. Like the mechanisms of  colour
vision that allow colours to be attended and thus allow colour concepts to be
grounded without prior knowledge of  a theory of  colours, psychological concepts
may be grounded on mechanisms without prior knowledge of  a theory of  mind.
German’s and Leslie’s position is the old abstractionism in disguise. According to
this view, concepts are formed from scratch by abstraction—by discriminative
attention (i.e. ostensive definition!) to features given in sense-experience. His
choice of  colour concepts is unsurprising here for they have always been the
abstractionist’s favoured examples. But as Geach (1957) has argued, abstraction-
ism fails to account for even so simple a concept as chromatic colour. More
importantly, sensory concepts, e.g. colour concepts, do not have the privileged
position in concept formation abstractionists typically think they have. They do
not have an epistemological primacy over others, for the description of  sensations
is a highly sophisticated use of  concepts, and is secondary to the description of
material objects. Indeed, a child may have the concepts of  book or chair before
it has any colour concepts at all. Similarly, to pretend or to infer pretence on the
basis of  the other person’s behaviour, although not requiring the preceding
command of  a theory of  mind to be applicable, is a highly sophisticated use of
concepts, and is secondary to non-pretend uses of  psychological and physical
object language.
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The recent resurgence of  Wittgenstein-informed psychology provides a welcome
antidote to the dominant tradition of  mentalism. Yet by overlooking the import-
ance of  conceptual stage-setting Wittgenstein-informed psychologists tend to
make the same mistakes as their mentalistic opponents and threaten to end up in
the repository of  behaviourism. A Wittgensteinian account of  “fictive mental
states” shows that the concepts of  the imagination and pretence are neither con-
cepts simply referring to mental states nor to behaviour. Instead they are concepts
the command of  which requires a creative use of  language on the child’s part.
Struck by various sorts of  similarities the child quite naturally applies a certain
use of  words beyond their primary domain of  application. This transferred use of
language is not the same as figurative and metaphorical language because the
meaning of  the words in the new domain cannot be paraphrased in other, literal
terms. In that respect there is an interesting similarity between words expressing
synaesthetic experiences and words for “fictive mental states.” Psychologists




Faculty of  Philosophy










 Carpendale & Lewis (2002) rely not only on Wittgenstein but also on his
commentators, in particular Hacker (1990) & ter Hark (1990). They also rely on earlier















 See Peter Geach (1957) for an early account of  the transferred use of  psychological
language. Geach however neither relates this topic to the primary-secondary distinction
nor to developmental issues in psychology or philosophy. The only sustained discussions
about the primary and secondary use of  words in Wittgenstein are to be found in Hintikka




 As Diamond (1991, p. 228) observes, the point is not that in some cases one cannot
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 Even Wittgenstein-informed psychologists have been misled by ordinary language
here. For instance, Chapman (1987, p. 114) who briefly discusses the distinction between
the primary and secondary sense of  words, takes the former to refer to ordinary uses and









 This is not to deny that the example of  calculating prodigies can also be used as an




 This is different from behaviourism precisely because the behaviourist ignores that
“mental calculation” is a secondary use of  calculating. The behaviourist typically claims
that mental calculating is a process like any other, and seeks to identify it with “covert
behaviour.” As B.F. Skinner put it: “If  there is an act which is equivalent to, or identical









 It is noteworthy that several authors refer to Austin’s definition of  pretence (e.g. Lillard




 Lillard’s preceding reference to the role played by parents is in that respect
exceptional, but note also that she particularly emphasizes their role in duping children




 See Hanfling 1991 on this point. Hanfling’s discussion, however, is not about the




 As a purely formal object it is even less similar to a primary representation than the




 Paul Harris (1995) tries to save Leslie’s hypothesis by supposing that quarantining
involves a membrane that permits only one-way traffic, from the primary to the
secondary representation but not conversely. But this is not a description of  an actual
mechanism but merely a metaphor. More importantly, the metaphor in fact hides the
conceptual or logical point concerning the dependency of  concepts, and not Leslie’s
hypothesis.
15 Note that this formulation expresses in fact the logical point of  the primary and
secondary use of  words as I understand it. Owing to the paradigm of  mental
representations, however, Lillard subsequently interprets “knowledge” in terms of  mental
representation. As a consequence, the “could not” is taken empirically rather than logically.
16 See J.D. Woolley (1995) p. 183.
17 Still, those children do not mean what a child would who makes believe that e.g. its
doll is in pain.
18 This, I maintain elsewhere (ter Hark 1990), is the general tenet of  Wittgenstein’s
discussion of  the concept of  seeing-as. See also Geach (1957).
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